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Litigating Second Life Land Disputes: A 
Consumer Protection Approach 
Paul Riley∗ 
A Secondary world may be full of extraordinary 
beings . . . and extraordinary events . . . but, like the 
primary world, it must, if it is to carry conviction, 
seem to be a world governed by laws, not by pure 
chance.1 
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  INTRODUCTION 
Anshe Chung is your typical real estate entrepreneur.2  Her 
business, Anshe Chung Studios, employs over eighty designers, 
architects, and other staff; and the property she has developed 
houses and provides commercial space for thousands of people on 
over forty square kilometers of land.3  With so much development 
for so many lessees, renters, and purchasers, it is not terribly 
surprising that Chung’s business has made her a millionaire.4  
What may come as a surprise, however, is that neither Chung nor 
the land she develops actually exists––at least not in the physical, 
corporeal sense.5  Though the dollars Chung receives for her 
parcels of land are real, she is simply an avatar,6 an online 
 
 2 See Robert D. Hof, My Virtual Life, BUS. WK., May 1, 2006, at 72. 
 3 See Anshe Chung Studios—Introduction, http://acs.anshechung.com (last visited 
Feb. 18, 2009). 
 4 See Hof, supra note 2, at 72; Press Release, Anshe Chung Studios, Anshe Chung 
Becomes First Virtual World Millionaire (Nov. 26, 2006), available at 
http://www.anshechung.com/include/press/press_release251106.html [hereinafter Press 
Release, Anshe Chung Studios]. 
 5 Hof, supra note 2, at 72. 
 6 “Representational proxies in . . . virtual spaces are known as ‘avatars,’ a word of 
Hindu religious origin.” F. Gregory Lastowka & Dan Hunter, The Laws of the Virtual 
Worlds, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1, 6 (2004) (citing Edward Castronova, On Virtual Economies 6 
(CESifo, Working Paper No. 752, 2002), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=338500). 
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representation of the Chinese businesswoman Ailin Graef, and 
Chung and the land she develops for her customers only exist in 
the virtual world7 Second Life.  The “land” is in reality nothing 
more than space on servers located in California, where Linden 
Research, Inc. (“Linden”), the operator of Second Life, maintains 
its headquarters.8 
As against other users of Second Life, Chung seemingly has all 
of the property rights in the proverbial bundle.9  She can use the 
land that she buys from Linden10 for herself.  She can transfer it to 
others.11  Indeed, Chung’s entire business model relies on free 
alienability of her virtual land.12  Perhaps most importantly,13 she 
 
 7 Edward Castronova, an economist, defines “virtual world” as follows: 
A virtual world . . . is a computer program with three defining 
features: [(1)] Interactivity: it exists in one computer but can be 
accessed remotely (i.e. by an internet connection) and simultaneously 
by a large number of people, with the command inputs of one person 
affecting the command results of other people[; (2) p]hysicality: 
people access the program though an interface that simulates a first-
person physical environment on their computer screen[; and (3) 
p]ersistence: the program continues to run whether anyone is using it 
or not; it remembers the location of people and things, as well as 
ownership of objects. 
Edward Castronova, Virtual Worlds: A First-Hand Account of Market and Society on the 
Cyberian Frontier 6–7 (CESifo, Working Paper No. 618, 2001), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=294828. 
 8 See Press Release, Anshe Chung Studios, supra note 4 (“The fortune Chung 
commands in Second Life . . . is supported by 550 servers or land ‘simulators.’”). 
 9 The description of property as a bundle of rights is a familiar trope in many law 
school property classes, and it has been used many times by the Supreme Court. See, e.g., 
United States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274, 279 (2002) (“A common idiom describes property 
as a ‘bundle of sticks’––a collection of individual rights which, in certain combinations, 
constitute property.”). 
 10 Linden provides land to its users via an auction system. See Second Life—Land 
Auctions, http://usd.auctions.secondlife.com (last visited Feb. 23, 2009). 
 11 See Second Life—Purchasing Land, http://secondlife.com/land/purchasing.php (last 
visited Feb. 23, 2009) (“Residents are always putting plots of land up for sale.  You can 
see what’s currently on the market by checking out Second Life’s inworld map to view 
what’s currently for sale . . . .”). 
 12 See Press Release, Anshe Chung Studios, supra note 4. 
 13 See generally Lorretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 433 
(1982) (“[T]he landowner’s right to exclude [is] ‘one of the most essential sticks in the 
bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property.’” (quoting Kaiser Aetna v. 
United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979))). 
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can also exclude other users from coming upon it.14  However, as 
against Linden, Chung has none of these rights, because in order to 
use Second Life, she, like all users, agreed to Second Life’s Terms 
of Service (“ToS”) that classify her not as an owner of land at all, 
but instead as merely a licensee of Linden’s server space.15  Thus, 
according to the ToS, Linden can shut down Chung’s Second Life 
account and seize all of her virtual assets for any or no reason.16  
Moreover, it can do so without paying her compensation.17  
Indeed, Linden’s ToS emphasize that Linden has no duty to protect 
any value purchased or created by Second Life users.18  Linden, of 
course, has every incentive to keep Chung happily in business in 
Second Life.  After all, she helps drive its economy by providing 
other users with developed land, a valuable service that is 
attractive to current and potential users of Second Life.  But what 
if Chung violated a term of the ToS, and Linden, as a result, 
terminated Chung’s account?  What rights, if any, would Chung 
have to her virtual assets?  Moreover, if a court found that Chung 
had some sort of property rights to her assets, would these rights be 
trumped by Linden’s contract rights under the ToS?  These rather 
 
 14 See Posting of Glyn Moody to Open . . . , Interview with Second Life’s Philip 
Rosedale, Part II, http://opendotdotdot.blogspot.com/2006/11/interview-with-second-
lifes-philip_28.html (Nov. 28, 2006, 1:28 P.M.) (stating that landowners in Second Life 
have an ability to exclude others from their land if they choose to do so as landowners). 
 15 See Second Life—Terms of Service § 3.1, http://secondlife.com/corporate/tos.php 
(last visited Feb. 18, 2009) [hereinafter Second Life—Terms of Service] (“Subject to the 
terms of this Agreement, Linden Lab grants to you a non-exclusive, limited, fully 
revocable license to use the Linden Software and the rest of the Service during the time 
you are in full compliance with the Terms of Service.”). 
 16 The ToS provide: 
Linden Lab reserves the right to interrupt the Service with or without 
prior notice for any reason or no reason.  You agree that Linden Lab 
will not be liable for any interruption of the Service, delay or failure 
to perform, and you understand that except as otherwise specifically 
provided in Linden Lab’s billing policies posted at 
http://secondlife.com/corporate/billing.php, you shall not be entitled 
to any refunds of fees for interruption of service or failure to perform.  
Linden Lab has the right at any time for any reason or no reason to 
change and/or eliminate any aspect(s) of the Service as it sees fit in 
its sole discretion. 
Id. § 1.6. 
 17 See id §§ 1.6, 5.3. 
 18 Id. § 5.3 (“Linden Lab does not provide or guarantee, and expressly disclaims . . . 
any value, cash or otherwise, attributed to any data residing on Linden Lab’s servers.”). 
VOL19_BOOK3_RILEY 4/21/2009  9:39:07 PM 
2009] SECOND LIFE LAND DISPUTES 881 
 
basic questions demonstrate Second Life’s new framing of the old 
struggle between property law and contract law.19 
Many commentators have made the normative case for why the 
law should recognize virtual property such as Chung’s land or the 
buildings that sit upon it,20 and some have suggested, as a practical 
matter, how a court might overcome the problem of the 
intangibility of virtual assets.21  Still other commentators have 
argued that virtual-world End User Licensing Agreements 
(“EULAs”) and ToS, including the ToS used by Linden for Second 
Life, should be struck down as unconscionable.22  While this Note 
shares the sentiment that courts should recognize virtual property 
rights, it argues that, at least in the near term, they will not—given 
 
 19 See generally Joshua A.T. Fairfield, Virtual Property, 85 B.U. L. REV. 1047, 1083–
84 (2005) (“[W]hy should we permit consensual agreements that prevent formation of 
property rights in the first instance any more than we tolerate other consensual restraints 
on alienation?  The function of property law is in large part to resist contractual 
limitations on property use.  If the restraint on alienation limits the property in question to 
low-value uses, we term it an unreasonable restraint and do not enforce it.”); Molly 
Shaffer van Houweling, The New Servitudes, 96 GEO. L.J. 885 (2008) (describing End 
User Licensing Agreements, EULAs, as the “new servitudes” and tracing the history of 
and judicial skepticism toward real covenants and equitable servitudes in the law). 
 20 See, e.g., Fairfield, supra note 19, at 1048 (“Should computer code that is designed 
to act like real world property be regulated and protected like real world property?  This 
article contends that it should.”); Lastowka & Hunter, supra note 6, at 72 (“[I]t seems 
clear that virtual assets can be characterized as property for the purposes of real-world 
law.”); Theodore J. Westbrook, Comment, Owned: Finding a Place for Virtual World 
Property Rights, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 779, 781 (2008) (“[A]n understanding of 
property theory suggests that property rights in virtual goods are bound to be recognized 
or created gradually as society increasingly depends on such rights.”).  Importantly, 
treating virtual assets as property would not create a new form of property and, thus, 
would not violate the common law’s ban on the creation of new types of property rights. 
See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of 
Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 4 (2000) (“In the common 
law, the principle that property rights must conform to certain standardized forms has no 
name.  In the civil law, which recognizes the doctrine explicitly, it is called the numerus 
clausus—the number is closed.”).  The numerus clausus principle functions to limit the 
creation of idiosyncratic property forms and consequently measurement, frustration, and 
administrative costs. See Merrill & Smith, supra at 38. 
 21 See Fairfield, supra note 19, at 1055–56; Lastowka & Hunter, supra note 6, at 42; 
Allen Chein, Note, A Practical Look at Virtual Property, 80 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1059, 
1075 (2006). 
 22 See, e.g., Andrew Jankowich, The Complex Web of Corporate Rule-Making in 
Virtual Worlds, 8 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1, 52–53 (2006) (concluding that EULAs 
and ToS should not be enforced because of their complete one-sidedness). 
VOL19_BOOK3_RILEY 4/21/2009  9:39:07 PM 
882 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 19:877 
 
the doctrinal deficiencies of the property- and contract-based 
approaches to finding those rights and given the effects of recent 
developments in the law regarding virtual worlds.  Consequently, 
this Note explores a third approach apart from property and 
contract law.  It examines Second Life, the virtual world that has 
recently become the subject of heavy judicial23 and government 
scrutiny,24 and argues that consumer protection law provides 
Chung and other landowners in Second Life with the best means of 
relief in the event that Linden seizes their virtual assets. 
Consumer protection law not only allows a potential plaintiff to 
avoid having to cut through the doctrinal Gordian knot presented 
by the contract-based and property-based approaches to virtual 
property issues, but also has a normative appeal because Second 
Life, much more than any other virtual world, is so vigorously 
commodified,25 and this commodification has largely been driven 
by Linden’s representations to Second Life users.  Two of the most 
glaring examples of Second Life’s commodification are Linden’s 
sales of land to Second Life users, which is the primary revenue 
generator for Linden,26 and Linden’s active fostering of a currency 
 
 23 A virtual land deal gone awry was the subject of Bragg v. Linden Research, 487 F. 
Supp. 2d 593, 604 (E.D. Pa. 2007).  See infra Part I.C.1. 
 24 See, e.g., Wily Ferret, Second Life Shuts Down Casinos, INQUIRER, July 26, 2007, 
http://www.theinquirer.net/inquirer/flame_author/004/1029004/second-life-shuts-down-
casinos/ (describing Linden’s decision to shut down casinos in Second Life after the FBI 
launched an investigation into their legality); Adam Reuters, US Congress Launches 
Probe into Virtual Economies, REUTERS SECOND LIFE NEWS CENTER, Oct. 15, 2006, 
http://secondlife.reuters.com/stories/2006/10/15/us-congress-launches-probe-into-virtual-
economies/ (describing Congress’s decision to investigate whether it should tax virtual 
economies). 
 25 Jack Balkin explains the fundamental problem of commodification of virtual worlds 
as follows: 
If platform owners encourage real-world commodification of virtual 
worlds, encourage people in these worlds to treat virtual items like 
real property, and allow the sale and purchase of these assets as if 
they were property, they should not be surprised if courts, 
legislatures, and administrative agencies begin to treat virtual items 
as property. 
Jack M. Balkin, Law and Liberty in Virtual Worlds, in THE STATE OF PLAY: LAW, GAMES, 
AND VIRTUAL WORLDS 86, 95 (Jack M. Balkin & Beth Simone Noveck eds., 2006) 
[hereinafter Balkin, Law and Liberty in Virtual Worlds]. 
 26 See Allen Rappeport, Second Life’s John Zdanowski, CFO MAGAZINE, Oct. 1, 2007, 
http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/9858165 (“Land sales and maintenance make up about 
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exchange, the LindeX, where Second Life’s currency, the Linden 
dollar, can be converted into U.S. dollars.27  The inevitable result 
of this commodification, when taken together with Linden’s 
representations about its virtual world, is reliance by Second Life 
users that, among other things, their rights to the virtual land that 
they believed they had purchased “free and clear,” a representation 
that Linden’s former CEO, Philip Rosedale, has made,28 are the 
same as their rights to real-world land to which they would 
actually hold title. 
Consumer protection law, unlike contract and property law, has 
a normative appeal here because Second Life’s commodification 
has transformed users of Second Life from mere “players” who are 
there to enjoy the world’s camaraderie and community into 
“consumers” who are there to spend and make money.  Consumer 
protection law recognizes the importance of this classification.  It 
jettisons the fiction that all actors in a marketplace have equal 
bargaining power or sufficient information to bargain at all, and 
instead affords relief to consumers based upon their classification 
as such.29  Markets often are not efficient, market actors are not 
 
60 percent of our billings.”).  Interestingly, in an effort to grow its total land sales 
revenue, Linden increased the land supply in Second Life and lowered its price. See, e.g., 
Eric Reuters, Linden to Increase Land Supply, Drop Prices, REUTERS SECOND LIFE NEWS 
CENTER, Apr. 8, 2008, http://secondlife.reuters.com/stories/2008/04/08/linden-to-
increase-land-supply-drop-prices/. 
 27 See Second Life—Currency Exchange, http://secondlife.com/whatis/currency.php 
(last visited Feb. 16, 2008) [hereinafter Second Life—Currency Exchange] (“Several 
online resources allow residents to convert Linden Dollars into US Dollars and vice-
versa.  Rates fluctuate based on supply and demand, but over the last few years they have 
remained fairly stable at approximately 250 Linden Dollars (L$) to the US Dollar.”). 
 28 Posting of Aleks Krotoski to Games Blog, Second Life and the Virtual Property 
Boom, http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/gamesblog/2005/jun/14/secondlifeand 
(June 14, 2005, 10:41 BST) (“We launched Second Life without out of world trade and 
after a few months we looked at it and thought, ‘We’re not doing this right, we’re doing 
this wrong.’ We started selling land free and clear, and we sold the title, and we made it 
extremely clear that we were not the owner of the virtual property.” (quoting Second 
Life’s then-CEO and founder Philip Rosedale)). 
 29 See John Goldring, Consumer Law and Legal Theory: Reflections of a Common 
Lawyer, 13 J. CONSUMER POL’Y 113, 116 (1990) [hereinafter Goldring, Consumer Law 
and Legal Theory] (“A real distinction between those who need the protection of the law 
and those who do not is based on their relative power.  In general, consumers as 
consumers lack power relative to suppliers and producers.  It can be argued that one 
function of consumer law is to redress this imbalance of power.”). 
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always rational, and market actors often have relatively little 
bargaining power.30  Consumer protection law, a legislative 
product, recognizes these realities while the common law of 
contract often does not.31  As discussed in detail below, one only 
needs to look to the current judicial trend of strictly enforcing 
EULAs and ToS for prominent examples of judicial failure to 
recognize the nature of the marketplace and for an example of the 
effect of this failure: the creation of doctrinal gaps in the common 
law that can easily ensnare unwitting market participants.  
Consumer protection law fills these doctrinal gaps and thus can 
afford relief where the common law cannot.32  Some land 
purchasers in Second Life, this Note concludes, have been 
ensnared, and courts hearing disputes between Linden and 
aggrieved Second Life users under California’s broad and powerful 
consumer protection law will ignore neither the nature of Linden’s 
representations nor the strong reliance interests that these 
representations created.  Consumer protection law’s doctrine is 
readily available to Second Life users; this Note advocates that 
they should use it. 
Part I of this Note begins by providing context regarding 
Second Life and explains the characteristics that make Second Life 
so different from other virtual worlds.  Next, Part I describes in 
detail how the economy of Second Life functions and how Second 
Life and particularly land sales there generate revenue for Linden.  
Finally, Part I explores some of the property-based and contract-
based arguments for judicial recognition of virtual property and 
examines (1) Bragg v. Linden Research, Inc., a case holding 
Linden’s ToS unconscionable;33 (2) the changes Linden made to its 
ToS in the wake of the court’s ruling; (3) how Bragg fits into the 
existing case law regarding the enforceability of EULAs generally; 
and (4) the likelihood of success of contract- and property-law-
based attacks on Linden in the future. 
 
 30 See id. 
 31 See John Goldring, Consumer Protection Globalization and Democracy, 6 CARDOZO 
J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 3–4 (1998) [hereinafter Goldring, Consumer Protection 
Globalization and Democracy]. 
 32 See id. 
 33 See Bragg v. Linden Research, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 593 (E.D. Pa. 2007). 
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Part II discusses the consumer protection approach in detail.  It 
explains the elements of Second Life’s commodification and the 
troublesome nature of Linden’s representations to its users.  
Moreover, it explains how California’s consumer protection law 
can regulate these representations and how specifically it can 
provide relief to an aggrieved Second Life user. 
I. SECOND LIFE’S LANDSCAPE, VIRTUAL PROPERTY, AND THE 
PROBLEM OF CONTRACT 
A. Brave New World: Second Life’s Landscape 
1. Why is Second Life Unique Among Virtual Worlds? 
In his seminal cyberpunk thriller Snow Crash, Neal Stephenson 
described an immersive online world in which millions of people 
could enjoy second lives, existences not all that different from their 
lives in the real world.  He wrote: 
Hiro is approaching the Street.  It is the Broadway, 
the Champs Élysées of the Metaverse. . . .  It does 
not really exist.  But right now, millions of people 
are walking up and down it. . . .  Of these billion 
potential computer owners, maybe a quarter of them 
actually bother to own computers, and a quarter of 
these have machines that are powerful . . . .  That 
makes for about sixty million people who can be on 
at any given time.34 
Stephenson referred to this world as the “Metaverse.”35  Simply 
put, Second Life represents an attempt by Linden to make 
Stephenson’s vision a reality.36  Second Life has millions of users 
 
 34 NEAL STEPHENSON, SNOW CRASH 24–26 (2008). 
 35 Id. at 24. 
 36 See Cory Ondrejka, Escaping the Guilded Cage: User Created Content and Building 
the Metaverse, 49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 81, 87–101 (2004) (stating that the Metaverse will 
only be fully realized when the free markets are invited into the world and when users are 
given ownership rights over their intellectual property and describing how Second Life 
has taken both of these steps). 
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from around the globe,37 and in July 2008 alone, economic activity 
equaling “[o]ver US$9.5 million was traded on the LindeX.”38  In 
Second Life, “residents,” as Linden refers to Second Life users, 
can take part in many of the same activities as they can in the real 
world.  They take on pursuits as complex as running a business,39 
staging a political rally for a real-world presidential candidate,40 or 
engaging in acts of civil disobedience;41 and as simple as going to 
a lecture42 or going for a spin with friends in the newest version of 
Toyota’s Scion.43 
These types of activities are quite different from the more 
purely gaming activities carried out in traditional “leveling” virtual 
worlds or massive multiplayer online role-playing games 
(“MMORPGs”), as they are often called.44  In MMORPGs, such as 
the hugely popular games World of Warcraft and EverQuest, a 
 
 37 See Second Life—FAQ, http://secondlife.com/whatis/faq.php (last visited Feb. 23, 
2009) [hereinafter Second Life—FAQ].  There is, however, some dispute over just how 
many of those users are logged in at any one time. See Shaun Rolph, The Phony 
Economics of Second Life, REGISTER, Dec. 20, 2007, http://www.theregister.co.uk/ 
2007/02/20/second_life_analysis/print.html (stating that there are only 15,000 clients 
logged in to Second Life at any one time). 
 38 Eric Reuters, Second Life’s User Economy Shows Strong Growth, REUTERS SECOND 
LIFE NEWS CENTER, Aug. 27, 2008, http://secondlife.reuters.com/stories/2008/08/27/ 
second-lifes-user-economy-shows-strong-growth/ (providing statistics on Second Life’s 
economic activity). 
 39 See Adam Reuters, Surge in High-End Second Life Business Profits, REUTERS 
SECOND LIFE NEWS CENTER, Dec. 5, 2006, http://secondlife.reuters.com/stories/ 
2006/12/05/surge-in-high-end-second-life-business-profits/ (describing the large growth 
in the number of Second Life residents making more than $5000 a month). 
 40 See Posting of Sarah Wheaton to New York Times Caucus Blog, Obama is First in 
Their Second Life, http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/03/31/obama-is-first-in-
their-second-life/ (Mar. 31, 2007, 3:52 P.M.) (describing grassroots organizers for Barack 
Obama in Second Life). 
 41 See generally Second Life: Facts for the Visitor, WIRED, 
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/14.10/slfacts_pr.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2009) 
(describing the Second Life “Tax Revolt” in which users dressed in colonial garb covered 
Second Life land with giant tea crates and signs protesting Linden’s tax on user created 
content).  This revolt proved successful, and Linden ultimately “repealed” the tax. Id. 
 42 For example, Judge Richard Posner gave a lecture in Second Life last year. See John 
Bringardner, IP’s Brave New World, LAW.COM, Feb. 1, 2007, http://www.law.com/jsp/ 
article.jsp?id=1170237755271; Alan Sipress, Where Real Money Meets Virtual Reality, 
the Jury is Still Out, WASH. POST, Dec. 26, 2006, at A1. 
 43 See Living a Second Life, ECONOMIST, Sept. 30, 2006, at 79 (describing Toyota’s 
decision to give away virtual drivable Scions to Second Life users). 
 44 See Lastowka & Hunter, supra note 6, at 26–28. 
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new user starts out the game as a weakling with neither the ability, 
nor the weapons, to slay powerful foes.45  Because slaying enemies 
is often what makes many of these games fun for a user, the user’s 
objective, naturally, is to increase the power or “level” of her 
avatar by taking on progressively more challenging tasks.46  For 
example, in EverQuest, a user interested in increasing her level 
must progress from killing snakes and rats at a very early stage to 
slaying much more powerful beasts once her avatar is at an 
appropriate level for the challenge.47  Second Life has no levels.  
Indeed, it has no objective at all.  Second Life is not a traditional 
MMORPG and does not really regard itself as one.48 
Creativity and ownership are the two greatest differences 
between Second Life and traditional MMORPGs,49 and these 
differences are at the very root of the commodification in the 
virtual world.  Second Life is a place for creativity because its 
users are responsible for creating the content of the world and 
everything in it.50  Indeed, Cory Ondrejka, a former executive at 
Linden, has even gone as far as unequivocally stating that “[a]ll of 
the content of Second Life is built by its users inside the world.”51  
Users are able to create the content of the world because Linden 
provides them with tools to manipulate small elements of virtual 
matter, primitives, which are a sort of virtual-world equivalent to 
real-world atoms.52  Using the process of atomistic construction, 
therefore, Second Life users can create everything from an article 
of virtual apparel to virtual office buildings.  They can create 
 
 45 See id. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Id. 
 48 See Second Life—FAQ, supra note 37 (“Is Second Life a Game?  Yes and no. 
While the Second Life interface and display are similar to most [MMORPGs], there are 
two key, unique differences: Creativity . . . Ownership.”). 
 49 See id. 
 50 See Living a Second Life, supra note 43, at 77 (“By emphasizing creativity and 
communication, Second Life is different from other synthetic worlds.  Most . . . 
MMORPGs . . . offer players pre-fabricated or themed fantasy worlds.”). 
 51 Symposium, Regulating Digital Environments: Ownership in Online Worlds, 21 
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 807, 820 (2006); see also Ondrejka, supra 
note 36, at 87 (“Well over 99% of the objects in Second Life are user created . . . .”). 
 52 See Living a Second Life, supra note 43, at 78. 
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objects that look and act like real-world objects or objects that defy 
the laws of physics.53 
The second difference, ownership, is closely connected with 
creativity.  In order to further spur the creativity of its users and 
accordingly the growth of in-world content, Linden recognizes 
Second Life users’ intellectual property rights to the content they 
create in Second Life.54  This idea is anathema in traditional 
MMORPGs.55  In practice, this means that Second Life users have 
control over the content they create and whether, among other 
things, the content can be copied, modified or transferred to 
others.56  Moreover, users are able to enforce these rights pursuant 
to the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”).57  
Interestingly, however, users have very few rights to their creations 
as against Linden.58  An exploration of the legal implications of 
 
 53 See id. 
 54 See Second Life—Terms of Service, supra note 15, § 3.2 (“Linden Lab 
acknowledges and agrees that, subject to the terms and conditions of this Agreement, you 
will retain any and all applicable copyright and other intellectual property rights with 
respect to any Content you create using the Service, to the extent you have such rights 
under applicable law.”); Second Life—IP Rights, http://secondlife.com/whatis/ 
ip_rights.php (last visited Feb. 9, 2008) (“Linden Lab’s Terms of Service agreement 
recognizes Residents’ right to retain full intellectual property protection for the digital 
content they create in Second Life, including avatar characters, clothing, scripts, textures, 
objects and designs.  This right is enforceable and applicable both in-world and offline, 
both for non-profit and commercial ventures.  You create it, you own it—and it’s yours to 
do with as you please.”).  Interestingly, one Second Life user recently trademarked her 
avatar. See Benjamin Duranske, ‘Aimee Weber’ (TM) Gets USPTO Stamp of Approval for 
Pigtails, Tutu, Wings, Tights, Stompy Boots, VIRTUALLY BLIND, Sept. 21, 2007, 
http://virtuallyblind.com/2007/09/21/aimee-weber-trademark/. 
 55 See Richard A. Bartle, Virtual Worldliness, in THE STATE OF PLAY: LAW, GAMES, 
AND VIRTUAL WORLDS 31, 37 (Jack M. Balkin & Beth Simone Noveck eds., 2006) 
(arguing from the perspective of a virtual-world designer that the designer of the virtual 
world should have absolute control over her world in order to protect the integrity of the 
game conceit). 
 56 Living a Second Life, supra note 43, at 78. 
 57 See Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) 
(codified in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.); Second Life—DMCA: Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act, http://secondlife.com/corporate/dmca.php (last visited Feb. 21, 2009). 
 58 The ToS grant Linden Labs “a royalty-free, worldwide, fully paid-up, perpetual, 
irrevocable, non-exclusive right and license to . . . use, reproduce and distribute [the] 
Content within the Service . . . and . . . [the right to] use and reproduce (and to authorize 
third parties to use and reproduce) any of [the] Content in any or all media for marketing 
and/or promotional purposes . . . .” Second Life—Terms of Service, supra note 15, § 3.2. 
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this contractual provision is beyond the scope of this Note, though 
it seems likely that this provision will be a source of litigation in 
the future.59 
Ownership and creativity in Second Life foster 
commodification because they allow for the creation of not only 
innovative products by users, but also a scarcity of those products 
and, consequently, creation of a marketplace where users can sell 
the in-world items that they create for Linden dollars, which they 
can then exchange for real-world dollars.60  Since April 2007, the 
trading activity of LindeX, Second Life’s currency exchange, has 
averaged around $250,000 a day.61  Users have been attracted to 
the commercial aspect of Second Life; running a business has 
become one of the most popular activities that take place in the 
virtual world.62  This is especially so given that in Second Life 
there are very few of the barriers to entry that exist in the real 
world and that the marginal cost of producing virtual inventory for 
sale is literally nothing.  Unsurprisingly, an entire cottage industry 
has developed around helping Second Life residents open and run 
in-world businesses.63 
2.  The Importance of Land in Second Life 
Running a Second Life business, however, has its costs.  
Importantly, only landowners in Second Life can sell their virtual 
 
 59 See generally Benjamin Duranske, Commentary: Second Life’s Terms of Service 
Stifle Innovation by Making Patents Worthless In-World, VIRTUALLY BLIND, Sept. 27, 
2007, http://virtuallyblind.com/2007/09/27/patent-rights-second-life. 
 60 See Second Life—Currency Exchange, supra note 27. 
 61 See Second Life Grid—Economics, http://secondlifegrid.net/spt/resources/fact-
sheet/economics (last visited Feb. 11, 2008). 
 62 See Living a Second Life, supra note 43, at 78 (stating that as of 2006, there were 
about 7,000 profitable businesses in Second Life); Second Life—Business Opportunities, 
http://secondlife.com/whatis/businesses.php (last visited Feb. 25, 2008) (“There are as 
many opportunities for innovation and profit in Second Life as in the Real World.  Open 
a nightclub, sell jewelry, become a land speculator; the choice is yours to make.  
Thousands of residents are making part or all of their real life income from their Second 
Life Businesses.”). 
 63 One can see this simply by searching “second life business” on Amazon.com.  There 
are many books dedicated to the topic of running a business on Second Life.  A cursory 
search yields such titles as How to Make Real Money in Second Life and The 
Entrepreneur’s Guide to Second Life. 
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creations.64  In order to own land, a user must pay a monthly 
membership fee, pay a land use fee, and purchase the land from 
Linden or another Second Life user, such as Anshe Chung, who 
has purchased the land from Linden.65  In this, Linden has 
incentivized the user’s purchase of land in Second Life.  This point 
is particularly important because Linden’s primary source of 
revenue is land sales.66  Again, this business model is markedly 
different from that of traditional MMORPGs, where the providers 
earn a bulk of their revenue from subscriptions.67  Linden also 
charges a monthly subscription for its “premium” accounts, and 
these accounts make up a substantial portion of the balance of 
Linden’s revenue;68 however, even this revenue is intertwined with 
the acquisition and ownership of land.  The primary benefit of a 
premium account, after all, is that it provides a “land ownership 
opportunity.”69  While a user with a basic (free) account can join 
Second Life, customize an avatar, interact with others, and even 
use Second Life’s atomistic construction tools, she cannot own 
land, and thus run a business, without upgrading to a premium 
membership.70  Land ownership, therefore, is not only very 
important to Second Life users, but also to Linden.  For users, land 
ownership provides the opportunity to run a business and in some 
cases, as with Ms. Chung, serves as the basis of the business.  For 
Linden, land and services connected with land generate a 
substantial majority of its revenue. 
 
 64 See Second Life—Frequently Asked Questions from Beginning Landowners, 
https://support.secondlife.com/ics/support/default.asp?deptID=4417&task=knowledge&q
uestionID=5198 (last visited Feb. 21, 2009) [hereinafter Second Life—FAQ from 
Beginning Landowners] (“Residents use their land to build homes and businesses.”). 
 65 Id. 
 66 Rappeport, supra note 26; Linden Lab—Factsheet: Economics, http://lindenlab.com/ 
pressroom/general/factsheets/economics/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2009) [hereinafter Linden 
Lab, Factsheet: Economics] (“Linden Lab’s primary revenue stream comes from the lease 
of virtual land.”). 
 67 See EDWARD CASTRONOVA, EXODUS TO THE VIRTUAL WORLD 32–33 (2007) (“In the 
late 1990s, all games were based on a monthly subscription model. . . .  But new revenue 
models have been introduced . . . .  Second Life, for example, offers free registration to 
anyone who wants it.”). 
 68 See Linden Lab—Factsheet: Economics, supra note 66. 
 69 See Second Life—Membership Plans, http://secondlife.com/whatis/plans.php (last 
visited Feb. 21, 2009). 
 70 See id. 
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Because land sales are Linden’s lifeblood, it is unsurprising 
that Linden actively markets its land to users with many different 
representations.  Part II.C of this Note explores those 
representations, their limits, and their consequences in its 
discussion of the benefits of consumer protection law for aggrieved 
Second Life users.  First, however, the next Section briefly 
examines some of the property-based arguments for judicial 
recognition of virtual property. 
B. Virtual Property Scholarship 
Though the leading scholars on virtual property issues explain 
why and to what extent a court should protect virtual property 
under property law, these commentators fail to address, as a 
practical matter, how, given the current state of both property and 
contract law, a court would go about finding a virtual property 
right.  This how question is particularly important given that all 
virtual worlds are governed by ToS and EULAs that have the 
function of inextricably intertwining property and contract law 
issues.71  Put simply, in order to find a user’s property rights in 
land or other virtual assets in Second Life, a court must take two 
steps.  First, it must strike down or otherwise refuse to enforce 
Linden’s ToS.  Second, it must articulate the property law basis of 
its decision.  This Section provides a brief overview of some of the 
property-based justifications for judicial recognition of virtual 
property. 
 
 71 Lastowka and Hunter do acknowledge the general problems posed by EULAs and 
ToS. See Lastowka & Hunter, supra note 6, at 72.  But they do not adequately explain 
that before a court is able to find a property right in virtual assets, it must first strike 
down the contract between the user and the world operator.  Fairfield also recognizes that 
perhaps because of EULAs and ToS, courts have yet to recognize virtual property rights. 
See Fairfield, supra note 19, at 1050.  But he sees ToS and EULAs as unreasonable, and 
thus unenforceable, restraints on property use. See id. at 1083.  However, he, like 
Lastowka and Hunter, does not discuss the current case law and the general reluctance of 
courts to strike down EULAs and ToS. 
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1. Normative Justifications for Recognition of Virtual 
Property 
Professors Dan Hunter and Gregory Lastowka were among the 
first commentators to explore the strong normative justifications 
for legal recognition of user rights in virtual property:72 Locke’s 
labor-desert theory, Hegel’s personhood theory, and Bentham’s 
utilitarian theory, they argue, “all provide strong normative 
grounds for recognizing that property rights should inhere in 
virtual assets, whether chattels, realty, or avatars.”73  Additionally, 
neither metaphysical nor temporal problems, Hunter and Lastowka 
argue, are problematic to recognition of virtual property.74  
Regarding metaphysical problems, our property system has long 
been characterized by a shift from the tangible to the intangible.75  
The demise of the livery of seisin is perhaps the oldest example of 
this shift.  Regarding temporal problems, many forms of property 
have temporal restrictions.76  Thus, just as a user of Second Life 
may not participate in land ownership activities if she does not pay 
her monthly fee, a lessee may only occupy her apartment for the 
period of her lease, or a copyright owner may only retain that right 
during the life of the work’s author plus seventy years.77 
Similarly, Professor Joshua Fairfield also provides a normative 
justification for judicial recognition of virtual property.78  He 
argues that three behaviors of property in virtual worlds make it 
more like physical property than something like computer code: 
rivalrousness, persistence, and interconnectivity.79  He describes 
these three traits as follows: 
If I hold a pen, I have it and you don’t.  [That is] 
[r]ivalrousness.  If I put the pen down and leave the 
 
 72 See generally Lastowka & Hunter, supra note 6, at 43–49. 
 73 Id. at 48–49. But see Stephen J. Horowitz, Competing Lockean Claims to Virtual 
Property, 20 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 443, 457 (2007) (arguing that, from a Lockean 
perspective, an operator of a virtual world like Linden has a stronger labor-based claim 
than users). 
 74 See Lastowka & Hunter, supra note 6, at 40–43. 
 75 See id. at 40. 
 76 Id. at 42. 
 77 See id. 
 78 See Fairfield, supra note 19, at 1054–55. 
 79 Id. 
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room, it’s still there.  That is persistence.  And 
finally, you can all interact with the pen—with my 
permission, you can experience it.  That is 
interconnectivity.  Why is code trying so hard to 
mimic these properties?  Rivalrousness gives me the 
ability to invest in my property without fear that 
other people may take what I have built.  
Persistence protects my investment by ensuring that 
it lasts.  Interconnectivity increases the value of my 
property due to network effects—not least of which 
is the fact that other people’s experience of my 
resource may be such that it becomes desirable, and 
hence marketable, to them.80 
Take land in Second Life as an example.  It is rivalrous 
because once a user purchases it, she can exclude others from 
entering upon it.  It is persistent because when a user signs off her 
Second Life account, the land and the developments she has made 
to it remain in the virtual world.  Finally, it exhibits 
interconnectivity because the user can allow others to interact with 
the land by allowing them to come upon it or lease a portion of it. 
Fairfield proposes property rights recognition at the level of 
code for virtual property81 because at the level of code “the power 
of an owner persists over the use of the virtual property regardless 
of the system or chattel currently connected to it.”82  In Second 
Life, for example, the owner of a piece of virtual land consisting of 
code on a server would own that code regardless of the intellectual 
property rights inherent in the underlying code and regardless of 
 
 80 Id. 
 81 Id. at 1077–78 (“Since virtual property operates as a unified whole only at the level 
of code, the appropriate package of property also appears at the level of code.  That is the 
right that matters. . . . The code right is what is important, no matter what system or 
chattel the code runs on.  So, when considering where to make the slice between online 
property rights, we will preserve useful bundles of rights by granting rights to virtual 
property at the level of code.”). 
 82 Id. at 1078.  Fairfield’s argument that the code level is the appropriate level in which 
to determine property rights to some extent challenges Professor Richard Epstein’s 
“chattel theory” that property affects cyberspace through actual chattel property rights in 
physical computers or servers. See Richard A. Epstein, Cybertrespass, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 
73, 75 (2003). 
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Linden’s ownership of the servers themselves.83  Moreover, this 
level of recognition, Fairfield contends, will best prevent an 
anticommons84 in virtual property:85 
[A]lthough the idea of the anticommons is recent, 
the function of property law in preventing an 
anticommons is not.  The common law of property 
has long sought to unify marketable title in a single 
person who has the full incentives to maximize the 
value, minimize the damage, and alienate the 
property when someone can put it to better use.86 
Prevention of the anticommons, Fairfield concludes, can best 
be achieved by regulating virtual property according to a system 
like the common law of property.87 
2. A Practical Approach 
Another commentator, Allen Chein, departs from the 
normative justifications of Lastowka and Hunter, and the 
anticommons argument of Fairfield, and instead explores how, as a 
practical matter, a court might find a property right in virtual 
assets.  He looks to domain name litigation for this answer.88  In 
 
 83 See Fairfield, supra note 19, at 1078. 
 84 See Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in Transition 
from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 623 (1998) (“Anticommons property [is] a 
type of property regime that may result when initial endowments are created as 
disaggregated rights rather than as coherent bundles of rights in scarce resources.”).  
Heller’s quintessential example of the anticommons problem at work was the practice of 
Moscow vendors: the vendors hawked their goods at stands in front of empty storefronts 
on Russian streets and not in the stores themselves because the stores had impossibly 
tangled webs of ownership rights and entitlements. See id. at 639–42.  The vendors were 
unable to determine who had the rights and entitlements to the storefronts; consequently, 
the storefronts went unused even though there was market demand for the space they 
provided. Id.  Professors Heller and Eisenberg also wrote about the anticommons 
problems raised by biotechnology patent claims. See generally Michael A. Heller & 
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation?  The Anticommons in Biomedical 
Research, 280 SCIENCE 698 (1998).  They argue that patent claims result in upstream 
tangles that can possibly hinder downstream technological development. Id. 
 85 See Fairfield, supra note 19, at 1076. 
 86 Id. at 1071. 
 87 Id. at 1089. 
 88 See Chein, supra note 21, at 1073–75. 
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particular, he examines Kremen v. Cohen.89  There, the Ninth 
Circuit applied a three-pronged test to determine whether a 
property right existed in the intangible domain name, sex.com, in 
an action for the name’s conversion.90  The Kremen court held that 
a three-pronged test must be satisfied in order for it to find the 
existence of a property right in an intangible object: “First, there 
must be an interest capable of precise definition; second, it must be 
capable of exclusive possession; and third, the putative owner must 
have established a legitimate claim to exclusivity.”91  The domain 
name, sex.com, satisfied this test.92 
The court reasoned that a domain name was a well-defined 
interest like a share of corporate stock—also intangible property—
or a plot of land because the registrant of the domain name is the 
only person who decides where on the Internet those who invoke 
the domain name in a web browser’s window are sent.93  
Moreover, the court found that the domain name was capable of 
exclusive possession and that Cohen had an established claim to 
exclusivity because the domain name was originally registered 
under his name.94  Registering a domain name, like recording a 
title at the title office, the court maintained, serves a notice 
function that the domain name is the registrant’s and no one 
else’s.95 
Underlying the court’s analysis was the recognition of two 
other concerns about domain names.  First, domain names, like 
other property interests, could sometimes be worth a considerable 
amount of money.96  Second, judicial recognition of a property 
right in domain names ensures that registrants who have invested 
labor in developing and promoting their websites reap the benefit 
of their investments, thus promoting the growth of the Internet 
overall.97 
 
 89 Kremen v. Cohen, 337 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 90 Id. at 1030; see Chein, supra note 21, at 1075. 
 91 Kremen, 337 F.3d at 1030. 
 92 See id. 
 93 Id. 
 94 Id. 
 95 Id. 
 96 Id. 
 97 Id. 
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Virtual assets, Chein declares, especially in a world such as 
Second Life, could satisfy this test;98 however, he ultimately 
concludes that a court would not recognize the interest because it 
would strictly enforce the ToS or EULA of the virtual world.99  
This issue of the general tendency of courts to enforce EULAs and 
ToS is an important one, and it foreshadows the contract 
discussion in the following Section of this Note. 
C. The Contract Problem 
Some virtual-world commentators assert that virtual-world 
EULAs and ToS should be attacked by aggrieved litigants on the 
grounds of unconscionability.100  Moreover, as discussed above, 
the assumption of some of the commentators who advance 
property-based arguments for virtual property is that the ToS and 
EULAs are indeed unenforceable.101  Other commentators have 
taken the opposite position.102 
This Section briefly examines some of the relevant case law 
regarding the enforceability of EULAs and ToS generally.  First, 
however, it examines the recent Bragg case, which struck down the 
arbitration provision of Second Life’s ToS as unconscionable, and 
the changes that Linden made to its ToS as a result of the case.  
Given the state of the law concerning EULAs and ToS and the 
changes Linden made to its ToS in the wake of the Bragg case, this 
Section maintains that contract-based attacks on Linden will not be 
successful in the future.  And, of course, if an aggrieved litigant 
cannot successfully attack Linden’s ToS, he or she cannot 
 
 98 See Chein, supra note 21, at 1090. 
 99 Id. 
 100 See, e.g., Jankowich, supra note 22, at 53. 
 101 See supra note 71. 
 102 See, e.g., Erez Reuveni, On Virtual Worlds: Copyright and Contract Law at the 
Dawn of the Virtual Age, 82 IND. L.J. 261, 303 (2007) (stating that, at least in the near 
term, it is unlikely that a court will void EULAs as unconscionable); David P. Sheldon, 
Claiming Ownership, but Getting Owned: Contractual Limitations on Asserting Property 
Interests in Virtual Goods, 54 UCLA L. REV. 751, 777 (2007) (“Existing case law tends 
to weigh against parties attacking EULA on grounds of unconscionability.”); Chein, 
supra note 21, at 1090 (concluding that virtual-world EULAs will be enforced); Bobby 
Glushko, Note, Tales of the Virtual City: Governing Property Disputes in Virtual Worlds, 
22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 507, 516 (2007) (presuming the general trend of enforceability 
of EULAs). 
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successfully establish a property-based justification for judicial 
recognition of virtual property. 
1. The Bragg Case  
Marc Woebegone, the avatar of Pennsylvania attorney Marc 
Bragg, owned land in Second Life, some of which he purchased 
for the purpose of speculation.103  In April 2006, Bragg discovered 
a glitch in Second Life’s land auction system that allowed him to 
buy a plot of land called “Taessot” for $300 when such a plot 
usually costs $1000.104  When Linden learned of this exploit, it 
shut down Bragg’s account, deleted his avatar, and confiscated not 
only Taessot, but also all of the land that Bragg had purchased and 
developed before the dubious transaction concerning Taessot.105 
Bragg filed suit in Pennsylvania state court alleging a number 
of causes of action including fraud, conversion, breach of contract, 
and violations of consumer protection laws.106  The common 
element among all of these causes of actions was a theory of 
reasonable reliance: Bragg argued that he relied upon Linden’s and 
its CEO’s representations purporting to convey rights to virtual 
property in Second Life equivalent to real-world property rights 
and was thus induced to purchase land in Second Life.107  The 
complaint contained many troublesome representations by 
Linden.108  For example, it cited a Guardian Unlimited interview 
with Linden’s then-CEO, Philip Rosedale.109  In response to a 
question concerning Western capitalism, Rosedale said: 
We like to think of Second Life as ostensibly as real 
as a developing nation. . . .  The fundamental basis 
of a successful developing nation is property 
 
 103 See Kathleen Craig, Second Life Land Deal Goes Sour, WIRED, May 18, 2006, 
http://www.wired.com/gaming/virtualworlds/news/2006/05/70909. 
 104 Id. 
 105 Id. 
 106 Complaint at 31–46, Bragg v. Linden Research, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 593 (E.D. Pa. 
2007) (No. 06-04925) [hereinafter Bragg Complaint], available at http://lawy-
ers.com/BraggvLinden_Complaint.pdf (original complaint filed Oct. 4, 2006, in Chester 
County Court of Common Pleas, then removed to federal court on Nov. 7, 2006). 
 107 Id. 
 108 See id. at 6–22. 
 109 Id. at 9–10. 
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ownership. . . .  We started selling land free and 
clear, and we sold the title, and we made it 
extremely clear that we were not the owner of the 
virtual property.110 
Additionally, Bragg’s complaint seemed to suggest that 
Linden’s recognition of its users’ intellectual property rights in 
their creations caused the Second Life users to conflate their rights 
to virtual property such as land with their own intellectual 
property.111 
Regarding the ToS, which gives Linden the unilateral right to 
shut down a user’s account and seize her land,112 Bragg maintained 
that the ToS were an unconscionable contract void as against 
public policy,113 and in the alternative, that Linden’s 
representations materially altered the ToS.114 
In response, Linden removed the case to federal court and 
shortly thereafter moved to compel arbitration pursuant to a 
mandatory arbitration clause in the ToS and to dismiss Bragg’s 
lawsuit for lack of personal jurisdiction over Philip Rosedale, 
Linden’s CEO at the time, who was also named as a defendant in 
the suit.115  The court rejected both motions.116  It first held that 
Rosedale’s representations provided sufficient minimum contacts 
with Pennsylvania for the court to exercise specific personal 
jurisdiction over him.117  The court reasoned that it had specific 
personal jurisdiction over Rosedale for two reasons.  First, 
Rosedale “helped orchestrate a campaign at the national level to 
 
 110 Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting Krotoski, supra note 28). 
 111 See id. at 11 (“In discussing the importance of land ownership . . . Rosedale stated: 
‘[S]uccessful countries always start by making sure that people can freely own, resell, 
and mortgage the real-estate on which they live.  This is a Very Big Idea . . . [.]  This was 
one of the key things that drove our ideas around land ownership and the introduction of 
IP rights.’”). 
 112 See generally Second Life—Terms of Service, supra note 15. 
 113 Bragg Complaint, supra note 106, at 25. 
 114 Id. at 29. 
 115 See Bragg v. Linden Research, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 593, 597 (E.D. Pa. 2007). 
 116 Id. at 603, 611. 
 117 See id. at 598 (“The Court holds that Rosedale’s representations—which were made 
as part of a national campaign to induce persons, including Bragg, to visit Second Life 
and purchase virtual property—constitute sufficient contacts to exercise specific personal 
jurisdiction over Rosedale.”). 
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induce persons, including Bragg, to purchase virtual land and 
property on Second Life.”118  Second, Rosedale’s marketing efforts 
were more active than passive.119  Indeed, the court concluded: 
[Rosedale] was the hawker sitting outside Second 
Life’s circus tent, singing the marvels of what was 
contained inside to entice customers to enter. . . .  
Significantly, participants could even interact with 
Rosedale’s avatar on Second Life during town hall 
meetings that he held on the topic of virtual 
property.120 
The court then held that the arbitration clause in the ToS was 
both substantively and procedurally unconscionable and, thus, 
refused to enforce it.121  The court stated: 
Taken together, the lack of mutuality, the cost of 
arbitration, the forum-selection clause, and the 
confidentiality provision that Linden unilaterally 
imposes through the TOS demonstrate that the 
arbitration clause is not designed to provide Second 
Life participants an effective means of resolving 
disputes with Linden.  Rather, it is a one-sided 
means which tilts unfairly, in almost all situations, 
in Linden’s favor.122 
Consequently, the case continued, and Linden answered 
Bragg’s Complaint shortly after the ruling.123  Interestingly, in its 
Answer, Linden characterized its representations concerning land 
as analogies or metaphors.124  “‘[S]elling land free and clear,’” 
Linden averred, “and selling ‘title’ are metaphors or analogies to 
the concept of ownership of real property, as what is ‘owned’ with 
 
 118 Id. at 600. 
 119 Id. 
 120 Id. 
 121 Id. at 611. 
 122 Id. 
 123 Posting of Robin Linden to Second Life Blog, Linden Lab Files Response to 
Complaint, http://blog.secondlife.com/2007/06/29/linden-lab-files-response-to-complaint 
(June 29, 2007, 1:34 P.M.). 
 124 Answer at 10–11, Bragg v. Linden Research, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 593 (E.D. Pa 
2007) (No. 06-4925), available at http://lawy-ers.com/linden-answer.pdf [hereinafter 
Bragg Answer]. 
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respect to ‘virtual land’ in Second Life is in fact a license to 
computing resources.”125  Moreover, Linden framed the primary 
issue in the case not as one of virtual property, but as one of fraud 
and exploitation on behalf of Bragg.126 
Even though Bragg was not an especially sympathetic plaintiff 
because his actions were potentially a violation of Linden’s ToS, 
Linden, shortly after answering the Complaint, decided to 
confidentially settle the dispute with Bragg.127  This may have 
proven to be a wise decision by Linden.  At least one mock jury 
familiar with the issues presented in the case, a Harvard Law 
School evidence class, found that Linden Lab was not justified in 
taking the property Bragg had acquired before the Taessot 
transaction.128  The students reasoned that Bragg was justified in 
his reliance on Linden’s representations.129 
2.   Bragg’s Immediate Consequences   
Shortly after the Bragg case, Linden altered its ToS.130  The 
objective of the change, understandably, was to bring the ToS into 
line with the Bragg ruling and forestall future attempts by Second 
Life users to attack the agreement and especially its arbitration 
provision on the grounds of unconscionability.  Linden focused its 
changes on three issues that the Bragg Court found problematic in 
the earlier version of the ToS: the potential cost of arbitration to an 
aggrieved user; the overall effectiveness and ease of use of the 
 
 125 Id. 
 126 See id. at 20. 
 127 See Adam Reuters, Linden Lab Settles Bragg Lawsuit, REUTERS SECOND LIFE NEWS 
CENTER, Oct. 4, 2007, http://secondlife.reuters.com/stories/2007/10/04/linden-lab-settles-
bragg-lawsuit. 
 128 See Second Life Herald, Harvard Law Mock Trial: Jury Votes Bragg 6, Linden Lab 
3, http://foo.secondlifeherald.com/slh/2007/02/mock_trial_at_h.html (last visited Feb. 24, 
2008). 
 129 See Jury Deliberation Transcript, http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/cyberone/wiki/ 
Jury_deliberation_Transcript (last visited Feb. 24, 2008).  Stephen Horowitz, one of the 
class’s students, has also written a law review article on the mock trial and the jury’s 
deliberations. See Stephen J. Horowitz, Bragg v. Linden’s Second Life: A Primer in 
Virtual World Justice, 34 OHIO N.U.L. REV. 223 (2008). 
 130 See Posting of Robin Linden to Second Life Blog, A Change to the Terms of 
Service, http://blog.secondlife.com/2007/09/18/a-change-to-the-terms-of-service (Sept. 
18, 2007, 11:07 PST) [hereinafter Robin Linden, Change to ToS]. 
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dispute resolution generally; and the arbitration provision was 
buried in a “General Provisions” section of the ToS.131  The 
revised ToS address all of these problems.  First, they provide that 
a user with less than $10,000 at issue in a dispute with Linden has 
the option to participate in “binding, non-appearance-based 
arbitration” that allows the user to choose to have her claim heard 
by an arbitrator “by telephone, online,132 or based solely on written 
submissions.”133  Second, the ToS, by capping the amount in 
dispute for the arbitration option at $10,000, effectively limit a 
user’s out-of-pocket arbitration expenses to around $200.134  The 
previous version of the ToS, on the other hand, required that 
binding arbitration be conducted in San Francisco in front of a 
panel of three arbitrators.135  Thus, under the old ToS, the cost of 
travel and arbitration for disputes would in most cases exceed the 
dollar amount at issue.136  Finally, the revised ToS now include the 
arbitration provision within a separate “Dispute Resolution” 
section.137  The revised ToS have yet to be tested by a court; 
however, as discussed below, it is likely that it will not be struck 
down as unconscionable in subsequent litigation.  
 
 131 See Bragg, 487 F. Supp. 2d at 607–11. 
 132 Interestingly, the online dispute resolution option opens the door for arbitration to be 
conducted within Second Life. See Adam Reuters, Linden Raises Possibility of Virtual 
Arbitration in New ToS, REUTERS SECOND LIFE NEWS CENTER, Sept. 18, 2007, 
http://secondlife.reuters.com/stories/2007/09/18/linden-revamps-arbitration-in-new-
terms-of-service/ (“‘We’re extremely excited about arbitration centers coming to Second 
Life’ said Catherine Smith, a spokeswoman for Linden.  ‘If the arbitrator can conduct 
arbitration in Second Life, we’re very much open to using Second Life to resolve 
disputes between Residents and Linden Lab.’”). 
 133 Second Life—Terms of Service, supra note 15, §§ 7.1–7.4. 
 134 See id.; Robin Linden, Change to ToS, supra note 130 (“[T]he exact cost depends on 
the ADR provider selected. . . .  For example, the National Arbitration Forum’s rules 
currently provide that consumers will pay at most $185.00 in disputes between 
consumers and businesses where the total amount of damages sought is less than 
$10,000.00 USD.  Businesses pay the remainder of the fees charged by the NAF.”). 
 135 See Internet Archive—Second Life’s Terms of Service, 
http://web.archive.org/web/20070515014546/http://secondlife.com/corporate/tos.php 
(last visited Mar. 8, 2008). 
 136 See generally International Chamber of Commerce—Arbitration Cost Calculator, 
http://www.iccwbo.org/court/arbitration/id4097/index.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2007). 
 137 See Second Life—Terms of Service, supra note 15, §§ 7.1–7.4. 
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3.  Davidson & Associates v. Jung138 and Its Implications 
Although there is a circuit split regarding the enforceability of 
EULAs in the general computer software licensing context,139 
Davidson v. Jung, an important licensing case, is relevant to 
Second Life and this Note’s analysis for two reasons.  First, as a 
factual matter, Davidson dealt specifically with the enforcement of 
computer game EULAs and thus would apply to Second Life, 
which a court is likely to regard as a game.  Second, the EULA at 
issue in Davidson was a “clickwrap” license.  A clickwrap license 
is one in which an online user clicks “I agree” to contract terms of 
use for the online program or service she desires to use.140  
Clickwrap licenses differ from “shrinkwrap” and “browsewrap” 
licenses because the former are actually contained in or on a 
package (hence the use of the term “shrinkwrap”) that contains the 
software that the user seeks to use.141  With the latter, the user may 
never see the contract at all, but the contract’s terms nevertheless 
provide that use of the website constitute assent to them.142  
Importantly, Second Life employs a clickwrap license, and a 
potential user of Second Life can only enter into the virtual world 
by clicking “I agree” to the agreement’s terms. 
In Davidson, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s 
decision to enforce the clickwrap EULAs of CD-ROM computer 
 
 138 Davidson & Assocs. v. Jung, 422 F.3d 630 (8th Cir. 2005). 
 139 Compare ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1449 (7th Cir. 1996) (enforcing 
the terms of a “shrinkwrap” EULA contained within a software CD), and I.Lan Systems, 
Inc. v. Netscout Serv. Level Corp., 183 F. Supp. 2d 328, 329 (D. Mass. 2002) (following 
ProCD and holding that the terms of a “clickwrap” agreement that appeared on 
defendant’s computer screen while defendant was installing plaintiff’s software and that 
defendant clicked “I agree” was also enforceable), with Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns 
Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 20 (2d Cir. 2002) (refusing to enforce a “browsewrap” EULA that 
appeared on-screen as plaintiffs installed Netscape’s internet browser software and noting 
that the plaintiffs’ “bare act” of downloading the software did not “unambiguously 
manifest assent” to the provisions of the EULA). 
 140 Mark A. Lemley, Terms of Use, 91 MINN. L. REV. 459, 459 (2006) [hereinafter 
Lemley, Terms of Use]. 
 141 See, e.g., ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1449; Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property and 
Shrinkwrap Licenses, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1239, 1239–47 (1995). 
 142 Lemley, Terms of Use, supra note 140, at 459 (“[A]n increasing number of courts 
have enforced ‘browsewrap’ licenses, in which the user does not see the contract at all 
but in which the license terms provide that using a Web site constitutes agreement to a 
contract whether the user knows it or not.”). 
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games created and sold by Blizzard Entertainment that required 
users to click an on-screen “I agree” button during the installation 
of the games.143  Defendants had reverse-engineered Blizzard’s 
games for multiplayer online use, thus violating the games’ 
EULAs.144  Because the Eighth Circuit spent no time discussing 
the details of the district court’s unconscionability ruling, it is the 
district court’s reasoning that is most instructive.  The district court 
held that the games’ EULAs were neither procedurally nor 
substantively unconscionable.145  Regarding procedural 
unconscionability, the court reasoned that although the parties in 
the case did have unequal bargaining power, defendants had the 
choice to purchase other video games or return the game for a 
refund if they were unhappy with the contract’s terms.146  
Moreover, the court reasoned, the EULAs’ terms did not “surprise” 
defendants because defendants had notice that the games were 
subject to EULAs and had thirty days to decide whether to adhere 
to the EULAs’ terms or to return the games.147  Regarding 
substantive unconscionability, the court, with little accompanying 
analysis, declared that the EULAs’ terms were not so one-sided so 
as to “shock the conscience” or “impose harsh or oppressive 
terms.”148  This result was not necessarily surprising, for as 
Professor Lemley notes, “[e]very court to consider the issue has 
found ‘clickwrap’ licenses . . . enforceable.”149 
Thus, it is clear that the Bragg decision cuts against the 
prevailing trend in the case law.  So, what explains Bragg’s 
outcome?  Additionally, are courts in the Ninth Circuit, where 
future battles regarding Second Life will be litigated,150 likely to 
 
 143 Davidson & Assocs. v. Jung, 422 F.3d 630, 634–35 (8th Cir. 2005). 
 144 Id. at 635. 
 145 See Davidson & Assocs. v. Internet Gateway, 334 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1179 (E.D. Mo. 
2004). 
 146 Id. 
 147 Id. at 1179–80. 
 148 Id. at 1180. 
 149 See Lemley, Terms of Use, supra note 140, at 459 (citing cases from years 1998 to 
2006). 
 150 Linden’s ToS contain a choice-of-law provision that provides that California law 
governs the agreement. See Second Life—Terms of Service, supra note 15, § 7.1 (“This 
Agreement and the relationship between you and Linden Lab shall be governed in all 
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find Linden’s ToS unconscionable given (1) the changes that 
Linden made to its ToS in the wake of Bragg and (2) the 
unconscionability analysis of Davidson, which is not only the most 
on-point of the “clickwrap” EULA precedents, but also the 
precedent from the highest court? 
4. Explaining Bragg’s Result 
Bragg’s anomalous result can, at least to some extent, be 
explained by the court’s reliance on Comb v. Paypal, Inc.151  
Importantly, the key facts of Comb are readily distinguishable from 
the key facts of Bragg.  To be sure, Comb, like Bragg, involved an 
arbitration clause being challenged as unconscionable; however, 
Comb involved a browsewrap license while Bragg involved a 
clickwrap license.  As discussed above, the distinction matters, for 
courts are generally much more likely to strike down a browsewrap 
license than a clickwrap license.152  In Comb, unlike in Bragg, the 
user agreement was not automatically displayed to customers prior 
to their signing up for the service.153  Instead, the agreement was 
accessible though a link that was on the same page as the “I agree” 
button.154  Thus, the Bragg court’s statement that the plaintiffs in 
Comb had assented to the agreement “in circumstances similar to 
this case”155 requires a somewhat broad reading of that phrase.  
Moreover, the clickwrap versus browsewrap distinction is 
particularly important because one of the primary factors that the 
Bragg court assessed in the procedural component of its 
 
respects by the laws of the State of California without regard to conflict of law principles 
or the United Nations Convention on the International Sale of Goods.”). 
 151 Comb v. Paypal, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d 1165 (N.D. Cal. 2002). 
 152 Compare Lemley, Terms of Use, supra note 140, at 462 (“The law has paid some 
attention to the impact of terms of use on consumers: virtually all of the courts that have 
refused to enforce a browsewrap license have done so to protect consumers.”), with id. at 
459 (indicating that every clickwrap license that had been challenged by the time of the 
article’s publication had been upheld as enforceable). 
 153 Comb, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 1169. 
 154 Id. (“A link to the text of the User Agreement is located at the bottom of the 
application.  The link need not be opened for the application to be processed.  The User 
Agreement is lengthy, consisting of twenty-five printed pages and eleven sections, each 
containing a number of subparagraphs enumerating the parties’ respective obligations 
and duties.”). 
 155 Bragg v. Linden Research, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 593, 607 (E.D. Pa. 2007). 
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unconscionability analysis was the surprise element.156  One would 
presumably be more surprised by terms that existed on a 
completely different web page, as in Comb, than terms that were 
on the same page as the “I agree” button, as in Bragg.  Because 
Comb was the lynchpin of the Bragg court’s analysis, and Comb is 
crucially distinguishable from Bragg, the court’s unconscionability 
analysis seems dubious. 
5. Will Linden’s ToS Be Held Unconscionable in the Future? 
It is not likely that a future court will find Linden’s ToS 
unconscionable for two reasons.157  First, by altering its ToS, 
Linden successfully addressed all of the issues raised in Bragg 
concerning its arbitration provision.158  This is particularly 
important because according to an empirical study, arbitration 
provisions are struck down as unconscionable at nearly twice the 
rate as that of other contract provisions.159  Second, it is likely that 
a court hearing the case would properly look to Davidson, and not 
Comb, for guidance on the issue of unconscionability, as Davidson 
is the leading case on the enforceability of clickwrap licenses, and 
it, like Second Life, involves the license agreement of what a court 
would likely regard as a game. 
Applying Davidson’s procedural unconscionability analysis to 
Second Life, an aggrieved Second Life landowner has a choice of 
other virtual worlds to join.  She, like the defendants in Davidson 
that could have purchased other computer games, could have 
chosen to join other virtual worlds such as There.com.160  Of 
course, There.com is not Second Life.  It offers a different user 
 
 156 See id. at 606 (“The procedural element of unconscionability also ‘focuses on . . . 
surprise.’” (quoting Gutierrez v. Autowest, Inc., 7 Cal. Rptr. 3d 267, 275 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2003))). 
 157 But see Sheldon, supra note 102, at 778 (stating that virtual-world users cannot 
terminate their agreements as easily as defendants in Davidson, that they may be 
surprised by virtual world EULAs that can be altered at any time, and that the substantive 
terms of EULAs that allow the virtual-world operator to close user access for any or no 
reason to her online assets may “shock the conscience”). 
 158 See supra Part I.C.2. 
 159 See Susan Randall, Judicial Attitudes Toward Arbitration and the Resurgence of 
Unconscionability, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 185, 186 (2004). 
 160 See There.com, http://www.there.com (last visited Mar. 28, 2008). 
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experience just as an alternate computer game would have offered 
a different gaming experience for defendants in Davidson; 
nevertheless, it is still an alternate choice.  Additionally, it is 
unlikely that an aggrieved plaintiff would be able to successfully 
deploy an argument for surprise with respect to the specific 
provisions of the new ToS given the tremendous amount of buzz 
among Second Life users about the ToS and the changes they 
received after Bragg. 
The substantive unconscionability issue under Davidson is a 
closer one.  It is not completely clear whether a court might find 
that the ToS provision providing that Linden can shut down a 
user’s account for any or no reason is so one-sided as to “shock the 
conscience.”  The empirical data, however, suggests that a court 
likely would not find the provision unconscionable, as the doctrine 
of unconscionability is scarcely used by courts,161 and as courts 
had enforced all clickwrap licenses before Bragg.162 
II. THE CONSUMER PROTECTION APPROACH 
A.  Why Consumer Protection? 
As the above sections indicate, the property-based and 
contract-based approaches to judicial recognition of virtual assets 
in Second Life are problematic from a doctrinal perspective.  This 
is because even the most practical and plausible of the property-
based approaches discussed above first requires a court to strike 
down Second Life’s ToS, and as the state of contract law, 
especially in the clickwrap context, seems to indicate, this is 
unlikely to happen.  Consumer protection law thus provides the 
best doctrinal grounds for aggrieved users of Second Life to 
 
 161 See, e.g., James R. Maxeiner, Standard-Terms Contracting in the Global Electronic 
Age: European Alternatives, 26 YALE J. INT’L L. 109, 121 n.69 (2003) (stating that the 
number of unconscionability cases “is in the tens or hundreds”); Robert L. Oakley, 
Fairness in Electronic Contracting: Minimum Standards for Non-Negotiated Contracts, 
42 HOUS. L. REV. 1041, 1062 (2005) (“Although unconscionability is an available 
doctrine and is occasionally used, in fact the number of cases in which it has actually 
been found is relatively small.”). 
 162 Lemley, Terms of Use, supra note 140, at 459. 
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receive judicial relief.  The policy arguments in favor of the use of 
consumer protection law are no less convincing. 
On policy grounds, three observations about consumer 
protection law are instructive: (1) the purpose of statutory 
consumer protection law has always been to cover those fringes of 
the law not reached by common-law doctrine;163 (2) consumer 
protection law, more than other areas of law, takes into account the 
effect of a company’s representations on consumers;164 and (3) the 
more commodified an environment becomes, the more its market 
participants are able to rely effectively on consumer protection 
law, because commodification itself transforms these participants 
into consumers, a group that the legislature has singled out for 
protection based on their status as such.165 
First, modern consumer-protection law as it has been 
articulated by the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) and state 
legislatures throughout the country has historically been a legal 
reform effort addressing the perceived inequities of traditional 
legal doctrine.166  In other words, it has traditionally been the 
purpose of statutory consumer protection law to patrol those areas 
of the law not covered by the common law of contract, property, or 
tort.  For example, “contract worship[s] the sanctity of the written 
agreement, and ma[kes] no exception for consumer transactions 
where the document [is] under total control of the seller and [is] 
not the subject of real bargaining.  Harsh adhesion clauses c[an] be 
forced on buyers who ha[ve] no viable alternatives.”167  Indeed, 
contract law assumes that parties to a contract are equal in terms of 
power and information, when in actuality, consumers have 
substantially less power and information than the large corporate 
entities with whom they frequently contract.168  Consequently, 
“[t]he common law of contract simply cannot afford consumers the 
protection they probably would seek if they were rational, fully 
informed, and equal in economic power to the supplier.  Because 
 
 163 E.g., DEE PRIDGEN, CONSUMER PROTECTION AND THE LAW 2–3 (2007). 
 164 Id. 
 165 See Balkin, Law and Liberty in Virtual Worlds, supra note 25, at 95. 
 166 PRIDGEN, supra note 163, at 2. 
 167 Id. 
 168 Goldring, Consumer Protection Globalization and Democracy, supra note 31, at 3. 
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contract law is an inadequate basis for the legal transaction, it must 
be modified by legislation.”169  Similarly, tort law places 
considerable obstacles in the path of consumers seeking redress for 
deceptive business practices and misleading representations.170  As 
a result, statutes such as the federal consumer protection law that 
prohibits unfair or deceptive practices, Section 5 of the FTC Act,171 
and California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”)172 contain 
broad language that was and continues to be flexible enough to 
effectuate the prophylactic purpose of the statutes and fill in the 
doctrinal gaps in the common law.173 
Consumer protection law’s broad purpose and history remain 
important in a discussion of Second Life because now, like the 
consumers in the early twentieth century who were the first to 
benefit from consumer protection laws, consumers in Second Life 
are not sufficiently protected by common-law doctrines; the likely 
continued enforceability of clickwrap contracts will render 
impotent both contract and property arguments by aggrieved 
Second Life users in the future.  Moreover, while a court’s finding 
of unconscionability of the ToS would be bold indeed, a finding of 
a violation of consumer protection law requires no such judicial 
boldness.  An unconscionability finding would not only blow 
against the prevailing winds of current case law, but also require 
expenditure of a court’s limited institutional capital, which the 
court may be disinclined to use for a cause like this.  Compared to 
Linden and other businesses that employ ToS and EULAs, Second 
Life users are poorly organized and politically impotent.  
Additionally, such a decision would also put a court at risk of 
being reversed on appeal.  This risk, of course, would not be as 
great if the court heard the case under consumer protection law. 
Second, consumer protection law’s focus on the effect of 
representations on consumers174 makes it a particularly valuable 
 
 169 Id. at 3–4. 
 170 PRIDGEN, supra note 163, at 2. 
 171 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2000). 
 172 CAL. BUS. & PROF. § 17200 (West 1997). 
 173 See JEF I. RICHARDS, DECEPTIVE ADVERTISING 12 (1990). 
 174 See FTC Policy Statement on Deception, reprinted in In The Matter of Cliffdale 
Assocs., 103 F.T.C. 110 app. at 174–84 (1984) (“Certain elements undergird all 
deception cases.  First, there must be a representation, omission or practice that is likely 
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option to an aggrieved Second Life user.  While both contract and 
property law do contain some features that regulate sellers’ 
representations regarding their products––take for example, 
fraudulent or material misrepresentation in contract175 or Section 
43(a) of the Lanham Act176––these features are either too difficult 
for a consumer to prove that they are effectively useless (fraud) or 
not available to consumers at all (the Lanham Act provision).  As 
discussed in further detail below,177 consumer protection proof 
requirements concerning the nature and effect of representations 
are much less rigid than those of the common law.  
Representations are significant to Second Life users because 
Linden’s representations concerning land sales and the company’s 
recognition of intellectual property are numerous and varied; also, 
these same representations have fueled Second Life’s tremendous 
growth and its commodification.  Linden has had huge incentive to 
mislead land purchasers with its representations concerning land; 
indeed, its business model has depended upon it.178 
Finally, Jack Balkin has argued that the more commodified a 
virtual world becomes and the more a virtual world’s business 
model is based upon its commodification, the more likely it is that 
aggrieved users will and should use consumer protection laws in 
the courts to protect their reliance interests.179  Commodification of 
a virtual world, the buying and selling of virtual items in the world 
using real-world currency, invites the law in.180  Balkin writes: 
Game designers cannot have it both ways. . . .  
The more that people flock to [virtual worlds], 
spend large amounts of time in them, become 
 
to mislead the consumer.  Practices that have been found to be misleading or deceptive in 
specific cases include false oral or written representations . . . .”). 
 175 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 162 (1981) (setting forth the elements 
of a material or fraudulent representation). 
 176 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2000) (permitting business competitors to sue each other for 
false advertising, among other things). 
 177 See infra Part II.B. 
 178 As discussed above, land sales generate more than half of Linden’s revenue, and in 
order to run a business in Second Life, one of the most popular activities in the virtual 
world, one must purchase land. See supra Part I. 
 179 See Jack M. Balkin, Virtual Liberty: Freedom to Design and Freedom to Play in 
Virtual Worlds, 90 VA. L. REV. 2043, 2046–47 (2004). 
 180 Id. 
VOL19_BOOK3_RILEY 4/21/2009  9:39:07 PM 
910 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 19:877 
 
enmeshed in them, and spend considerable sums in 
them––as the business model hopes they will––the 
more people will demand that the state protect them 
when they are injured in ways that they think are 
inappropriate, whether or not the EULA or the TOS 
give them any remedy. . . . [T]he more that the 
platform owner attempts to make the game space a 
new version of the shopping mall, the less likely the 
First Amendment will or should protect them when 
the state wants to vindicate the reliance and 
property interests of the players. . . .  Treat the 
players as consumers, and they will demand 
consumer protection.181 
It seems that underlying Balkin’s argument is the notion that 
commodification transforms mere “players” of Second Life into 
“consumers,” and that once this transformation has occurred, 
consumer protection law provides special protection to consumers 
in a dynamic marketplace based upon the consumers’ classification 
as such.  This idea that “consumers are different” is an important 
theory underlying consumer protection law.182  It recognizes that 
the consumer, a single person, often has neither the power nor the 
information to appropriately protect her own interests and that the 
common law often does not adequately protect these interests 
either.183  Consequently, the legislature must provide the protection 
that the common law cannot.  The purpose of contract and property 
law, on the other hand, has little to do with a rightholder’s special 
status as a consumer.184 
 
 181 Id. at 2073. 
 182 See Goldring, Consumer Law and Legal Theory, supra note 29, at 116. 
 183 Goldring, Consumer Protection Globalization and Democracy, supra note 31, at 3–
4. 
 184 Professors Merrill and Smith’s description of the purpose of contract and property 
law is instructive: 
In personam [contract] rights are an instance of what can be called a 
governance strategy for determining use rights; in rem [property] 
rights reflect an exclusion strategy for determining use rights. . . .  
Governance rules typically specify particular uses in some detail, 
including often the identity of the rightholder and the dutyholder.  
Indeed, often the dutyholder will need to know the identity of the 
rightholder in order to avoid violating the duty. . . .  Exclusion 
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Linden clearly possesses the attributes described by Balkin, 
and Linden’s business model is based upon commodification of 
Second Life in three respects.  First, land sales in Second Life 
make up more than a majority of the company’s revenue.185  
Second, only landowners in Second Life can run businesses, an 
activity that is one of the primary attractions of the virtual world in 
the first instance.186  Finally, Linden has made the business 
decision to actively commodify Second Life, and the examples of 
commodification abound: Linden runs a currency exchange for its 
users;187 it made the strategic decision to grant its users IP rights in 
their creations,188 thus encouraging users to trade their creations 
via market transactions; and it encourages those who do choose to 
buy land from Linden to subdivide, resell, or rent it as the owner 
sees fit.189  Commodification of Second Life has quickly brought 
Linden millions of users and much business success; however, it is 
also what places the company at risk of suit under consumer 
protection law. 
Moreover, Linden’s relationship with its users, particularly 
regarding land, is one in which there is particularly acute 
information asymmetry.  Legislatures enacting consumer 
protection laws recognized the risks of this very type of asymmetry 
and that consumer protection law, unlike common law, is meant to 
protect users from ex post.  Linden does not make it clear to its 
users what they are getting when they “buy land” from the 
company.  In fact, it may be so that because land sales are so 
 
strategies, by contrast, proceed by restricting access to a particular 
resource rather than by specifying permitted or prohibited uses. 
Thomas E. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Property/Contract Interface, 101 COLUM. L. 
REV. 773, 791 (2001). 
 185 See Rappeport, supra note 26. 
 186 See supra Part I.A. 
 187 See Second Life—Currency Exchange, supra note 27. 
 188 See Ondrejka, supra note 36, at 95. 
 189 See Second Life—How Do I Join & Split Land?, 
https://support.secondlife.com/ics/support/default.asp?deptID=4417&task=knowledge&q
uestionID=4243 (last visited Feb. 21, 2009); Second Life—How Do I Rent Land to Other 
People?, https://support.secondlife.com/ics/support/default.asp?deptID=4417&task= 
knowledge&questionID=4416 (last visited Feb. 21, 2009); Second Life—How Do I Sell 
Land?, https://support.secondlife.com/ics/support/default.asp?deptID=4417&task= 
knowledge&questionID=4530 (last visited Feb. 21, 2009); Second Life—Land: Get Your 
Land, http://secondlife.com/community/land-getyours.php (last visited Feb. 10, 2008). 
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important to Linden, Linden, as part of its marketing, actually 
attempts make this as unclear as possible.  For example, on the 
Frequently Asked Questions from Beginning Landowners (“FAQ”) 
webpage,190 there is not a single question and answer that explains 
the rights a user has to land once she has purchased it from Linden 
or that conveys any information similar to that of the critical 
provisions of Linden’s ToS.191  The author of this Note imagines 
that it would be quite simple for Linden to add a few questions and 
answers to the FAQ page that communicate, inter alia, that 
purchased land in Second Life is nothing more than licensed space 
on servers owned by Linden in California and that Linden has the 
right to seize a user’s land for any or no reason.  The 
communication of these facts, however, does not seem to be in 
Linden’s business interest as it could result in fewer land sales and 
consequently less revenue for Linden. 
Additionally, the uniqueness of Second Life’s land sales model 
among virtual-world providers exacerbates a Second Life user’s 
lack of information because she has few frames of reference from 
which to know what is common or standard industry practice.  
Since Linden is only one of the few virtual-world providers that 
sell land, it is not clear that there is a standard industry practice.  
Consequently, Second Life users are left at the mercy of Linden 
and its representations.  All they know is what Linden tells them, 
and what Linden tells them is terribly insufficient. 
The following Section shows the ease with which a court can 
apply consumer protection doctrine to land sales in Second Life 
and describes in further detail how Linden’s representations 
ultimately may bring the company liability in the courtroom. 
B. Applicable Law—California’s Unfair Competition Law 
(“UCL”) 
Linden’s ToS contain a choice-of-law provision that provides 
that California law governs the agreement.192  This is, at least from 
 
 190 See Second Life—FAQ from Beginning Landowners, supra note 64. 
 191 See id. 
 192 See Second Life—Terms of Service, supra note 15, § 7.1 (“This Agreement and the 
relationship between you and Linden Lab shall be governed in all respects by the laws of 
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the consumer protection perspective, an asset to an aggrieved 
Second Life user because California’s consumer protection laws 
are among the strongest in the country,193 particularly California’s 
Unfair Competition Law.194  The UCL broadly defines unfair 
competition and prohibits it under five prongs: (1) unlawful 
conduct; (2) unfair conduct; (3) fraudulent conduct; (4) deceptive 
advertising; and (5) violations of § 17500, California’s “false 
advertising” statute.195  The “unlawful” prong covers any business 
practice that violates any statute, regulation, or ordinance,196 and it, 
like the “deceptive advertising” and “false advertising” prongs, 
would be less helpful to an aggrieved Second Life user in an action 
under the UCL than the “unfair” and “fraudulent” prongs.197 
There are two tests of a business practice under the “unfair” 
prong of the UCL.  In one, a court must weigh the utility of the 
defendant’s conduct against the nature of the harm to the plaintiff 
while taking into consideration the motives of the alleged 
wrongdoer.198  In the other, the court must determine whether the 
alleged business practice is “immoral, unethical, oppressive, 
 
the State of California without regard to conflict of law principles or the United Nations 
Convention on the International Sale of Goods.”). 
 193 See, e.g., Wershaba v. Apple Computer, Inc., 110 Cal. Rptr. 2d 145, 160 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2001) (“California’s consumer protection laws are among the strongest in the 
country. . . . California’s unfair competition law imposes liability without the necessity of 
showing intent.”). 
 194 See ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, CONSUMER PROTECTION HANDBOOK 76–77 
(2004) (“California’s consumer protection statute . . . warrants special mention because of 
the breadth of the statute, California’s importance as a commercial state, and the 
enforcement activism of both the Attorney General’s office and private plaintiffs within 
the state.”). 
 195 Sharon J. Arkin, The Unfair Competition Law After Proposition 64: Changing the 
Consumer Protection Landscape, 32 W. ST. U. L. REV. 155, 157 (2005); see also CAL. 
BUS. & PROF. § 17200 (West 2009). 
 196 Arkin, supra note 195, at 158. 
 197 The “deceptive advertising” prong is substantially similar to the “false advertising” 
prong of the UCL. Id. at 163.  The “false advertising” prong is less forgiving than the 
fraud prong because it has a scienter requirement. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. § 17500 (West 
2009) (prohibiting any advertising “which is untrue or misleading, and which is known, 
or which by the exercise of reasonable care should be known, to be untrue or misleading . 
. . .”); Arkin, supra note 195, at 161, 164. 
 198 Motors, Inc. v. Times Mirror Co., 162 Cal. Rptr. 543, 546 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980). 
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unscrupulous or substantially injurious to customers.”199  Though 
the California Supreme Court has determined the appropriate 
“unfair” test in competitor-versus-competitor actions,200 it has yet 
to determine the standard in consumer actions.201 
A business practice is fraudulent when “members of the public 
are likely to be deceived” by the defendant’s conduct.202  This 
standard, of course, is quite different from that of a common-law 
fraud claim, which requires intent to deceive, actual falsehood, and 
damages to the victim.203  A business practice is “likely to deceive” 
under the “fraudulent” prong of the UCL if it is “probable that a 
significant portion of the general consuming public or of targeted 
consumers, acting reasonably in the circumstances, could be 
misled.”204  Where the business practice “is targeted to a particular 
group or type of consumers [that is] either more . . . or less 
sophisticated than the ordinary consumer, . . . whether it is 
misleading to the public” will be judged from the view of members 
of the targeted group.205  Moreover, there is no requirement that 
the alleged fraudulent business practice occur in the context of an 
advertisement.206  For example, in People v. Dollar Rent-a-Car 
Systems, Inc., the California Court of Appeals affirmed the trial 
court’s conclusion that Dollar’s contract language and its 
 
 199 People v. Casa Blanca Convalescent Homes, 206 Cal. Rptr. 164, 177 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1984). 
 200 See Cel-Tech Commc’ns, Inc. v. L.A. Cellular Tel. Co., 973 P.2d 527, 544 (Cal. 
1999) (“[T]he word ‘unfair’ in [the UCL] means conduct that threatens an incipient 
violation of an antitrust law, or violates the policy or spirit of one of those laws because 
its effects are comparable to or the same as a violation of the law, or otherwise 
significantly threatens or harms competition.”). 
 201 Arkin, supra note 195, at 160. 
 202 Comm. on Children’s Television v. Gen. Foods Corp., 673 P.2d 660, 668 (Cal. 
1983). 
 203 See, e.g., Day v. AT&T, 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d 55, 60 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (“A fraudulent 
deception must be actually false, known to be false by the perpetrator and reasonably 
relied upon by a victim who incurs damages.  None of these elements are required to state 
a claim for injunctive relief under [the UCL].  A perfectly true statement couched in such 
a manner that it is likely to mislead or deceive the consumer, such as by failure to 
disclose other relevant information, is actionable under these sections.”). 
 204 Lavie v. Procter & Gamble Co., 129 Cal. Rptr. 2d 486, 495 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003). 
 205 Id. at 498. 
 206 Arkin, supra note 195, at 163. 
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employees’ conduct regarding the company’s collision damage 
waiver were a violation of the UCL.207 
The “primary purpose of [the UCL is] to ‘extend[] to the entire 
consuming public the protection once afforded only to business 
competitors.’”208  Consequently, courts should construe the UCL 
broadly.209  Nevertheless, despite the broad language of the statute 
and its public policy underpinnings, the UCL has two 
shortcomings: (1) it only offers injunctive relief, not monetary 
damages, to an aggrieved consumer;210 and (2) it has a standing 
provision211 enacted by a voter proposition212 that can foreclose a 
claim under the UCL for some potential litigants. 
The first shortcoming can be somewhat easily overcome, 
however, because although the UCL does not provide for monetary 
damages, it does allow for restitution.213  As the Supreme Court of 
California explained in Cortez v. Purolator Air Filtration Products 
Co., the remedies provision of the UCL  
authorizes the court to fashion remedies to prevent, 
deter, and compensate for unfair business practices.  
In addition to injunctions, it authorizes orders that 
are necessary to prevent practices that constitute 
unfair competition and to make “orders or 
judgments . . . as may be necessary to restore” to 
persons in interest any money or property acquired 
by unfair competition.214   
Consequently, the court upheld the equitable judgments of trial 
and appellate courts ordering a business to pay an employee whose 
 
 207 See People v. Dollar Rent-a-Car Sys., Inc., 259 Cal Rptr. 191, 197–99 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1989). 
 208 Bank of the W. v. Superior Court, 833 P.2d 545, 551 (Cal. 1992) (quoting Barquis v. 
Merchants Collection Ass’n, 496 P.2d 817, 828 (Cal. 1972)). 
 209 See Arkin, supra note 195, at 157. 
 210 See CAL. BUS. & PROF. § 17203 (West 2009). 
 211 See id. § 17204 (“[Standing for an individual is limited to] a person who has suffered 
injury in fact and has lost money or property as a result of the unfair competition.”). 
 212 See generally Arkin, supra note 195, at 167–70  (discussing Proposition 64 and its 
standing requirement); Jacquetta Lannan, Saving 17200: An Analysis of Proposition 64, 
46 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 451 (2006) (same). 
 213 See Arkin, supra note 195, at 165. 
 214 Cortez v. Purolator Air Filtration Prods. Co., 999 P.2d 706, 714–15 (Cal. 2000). 
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wages it withheld in violation of California’s labor code, and thus, 
the UCL.215  The court reasoned that the restitution order was 
appropriate because it restored the employee to status quo ante216 
and because he had a “vested property right[]” in the withheld 
salary, even though the employee never had actual possession of 
it.217  More recently, the California Supreme Court stated the UCL 
principle of restitution even more succinctly: “Under the UCL, an 
individual may recover profits unfairly obtained to the extent that 
these profits represent monies given to the defendant or benefits in 
which the plaintiff has an ownership interest.”218  Additionally, a 
court can order restitution even when injunctive relief is not 
appropriate;219 that is, a court can order restitution even when the 
defendant has stopped engaging in unlawful conduct.220  Thus, 
even though the UCL does not technically allow for recovery of 
monetary damages, an order of restitution, for all intents and 
purposes, produces the same result as an award of damages to a 
plaintiff with a vested property interest or ownership right in 
property that was lost as a result of the violation of the UCL. 
Section 17204, the UCL’s provision on standing, provides that 
in order for a private individual to bring a UCL claim the 
individual must be one who “has suffered injury in fact” and who 
has “lost money or property as a result of such unfair 
competition.”221  Previously, the standing requirement was far less 
stringent and “a private plaintiff who ha[d] himself suffered no 
injury at all [could] sue to obtain relief for others.”222  The standing 
provision, therefore, now has important implications for 
 
 215 Id. at 715. 
 216 Id. 
 217 Id. (quoting Loehr v. Ventura Cmty. Coll. Dist., 195 Cal. Rptr. 576, 581 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1983)). 
 218 Korea Supply v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 63 P.3d 937, 947 (Cal. 2003). 
 219 See, e.g., ABC Int’l Traders v. Matsushita Elec. Corp., 931 P.2d 290, 304 (Cal. 
1997) (“[W]e conclude that [the UCL] authorizes a trial court to order restitution of 
money lost though acts of unfair competition . . . whether or not the court also enjoins 
future violations.”). 
 220 Arkin, supra note 195, at 165. 
 221 CAL. BUS. & PROF. § 17204. 
 222 See Stop Youth Addiction, Inc. v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 950 P.2d 1086, 1091 (Cal. 
1998) (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
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representative actions and situations where harm to a specific 
person might be hard to prove.223 
C. Application of the UCL to Second Life 
The “fraudulent” prong of the UCL provides the best chance of 
recovery for an aggrieved Second Life landowner.  It has the 
broadest language of the UCL prongs: unlike the “false 
advertising” prong, it lacks a scienter requirement; and, unlike the 
“unfair” prong, its law is well-settled and clear with regard to 
consumer transactions.224  The Second Life user would have a 
strong argument that a significant portion of targeted consumers, 
acting reasonably in the circumstances, could be misled by the 
representations of Linden and its executives about land ownership 
and property ownership in general in Second Life for three 
reasons. 
First, Linden and Philip Rosedale, Linden’s founder and 
original CEO, have explicitly used real-property terms when 
discussing what Linden claims is simply licensing of server space 
by a user.  As discussed above, for example, Rosedale has 
mentioned “selling free and clear” while describing land sales.225  
Even more simply, the Second Life website uses the term “land” to 
describe the server space and discusses “land sales” and the 
process of “buy[ing] land” from residents.226  Nowhere on the 
Second Life land webpages does it say what exactly land is (server 
space) and what exactly users are getting when they buy it (a 
license).  Moreover, the ToS do not contain this information either.  
Additionally, the land “analogy,” as Linden refers to it,227 is not on 
the Second Life website or mentioned in any of Linden’s numerous 
press releases hyping its service.  Indeed, from what the author of 
 
 223 See, e.g., Shannon Z. Peterson, California Proposition 64 Requires That Pending 
Actions Based on Unfair Competition or False Advertising Laws Be Dismissed, 10 STAN. 
J.L. BUS. & FIN. 73, 73–74 (2005). 
 224 See generally Arkin, supra note 195, at 160–64. 
 225 See Krotski, supra note 28. 
 226 See Second Life, Land: Get Your Land, supra note 189. 
 227 Bragg Answer, supra note 124, at 10–11. 
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this Note could find, Linden has mentioned the analogy publicly in 
only two publications.228 
Second, and perhaps more important, Linden and its officers 
have made representations that indicate that they do not regard 
Second Life as a “game space” at all, but instead, an extension of 
the real world.  Cory Ondrejka, a former Linden executive, said in 
an academic symposium on virtual worlds, “[t]here are virtually no 
traditional game elements in Second Life other than if you look at 
the real world as a game, it looks a lot like that.”229  In other words, 
Ondrejka argues that Second Life is not a game at all.  Indeed, 
while discussing Second Life, both Ondrejka and Rosedale have 
elucidated this principle clearly by comparing Second Life to a 
developing nation.  In one interview, Rosedale said, “[w]e like to 
think of Second Life as ostensibly as real as a developing 
nation. . . .  When we were developing the idea we . . . were 
inspired by Hernando de Soto’s The Mystery of Capital . . . .  The 
fundamental basis of a successful developing nation is property 
ownership.”230  Ondrejka echoed this sentiment in an article he 
wrote for a virtual-world symposium.  He writes: 
New insight comes from Hernando de Soto’s work 
in developmental economics, The Mystery of 
Capital.  In brief, de Soto argues that when property 
 
 228 Linden CFO John Zdanowski explained the analogy to CFO Magazine in 2007: 
Server space in Second Life is called “land,” using a three-
dimensional analogy for land.  Each CPU can host, or simulate, 16 
acres of land.  We sell each region as an island for $1,675 as an 
upfront setup fee, and then we charge $195 a month for the monthly 
maintenance fee, which is a recurring charge. 
Rappeport, supra note 26.  And, to interviewer Kate Bulkley of The Guardian, Linden’s 
then-CEO Philip Rosedale stated: 
It is a virtual real estate business but it is a little less abstract than a 
lot of people suggest. What we are really selling you is computation. 
We are selling you CPU core. If you buy a 16-acre piece of land, 
which is about four city blocks, what you are renting is one 
processor. 
Kate Bulkley, Today Second Life, Tomorrow the World, GUARDIAN, May 17, 2007, 
Technology News & Features, at 5, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/ 
2007/may/17/media.newmedia2. 
 229 Symposium, Ownership in Online Worlds, 21 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH 
TECH. L.J. 807, 821 (2005). 
 230 See Krotski, supra note 28. 
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does not have recognized titles and proofs of 
ownership, it is not fungible.  Thus, the vast 
majority of the third world’s population, despite 
having valuable assets like homes, land, businesses, 
cannot leverage these assets because they do not 
legally own them. . . .  Most relevant to the 
Metaverse [Second Life], untitled property cannot 
be used to secure loans or to set up a legal business.  
On the way to the Metaverse, individuals and 
businesses will create objects of significant value, 
and may well be handsomely rewarded for it. . . .  In 
the real world, lack of ownership is a fatal flaw in 
attempts to establish free markets.  It would be a 
mistake to think that virtual worlds will be any 
different—free markets and property rights are pre-
requisites to innovation.231 
If Linden regards, or at least used to regard,232 Second Life as 
an extension of the real world and treats it as such by running a 
currency exchange,233 engaging in land sales, and regulating 
Second Life in compliance with at least some federal laws,234 it 
should not be surprising that its users regard and treat it similarly 
and expect that, as in the real world, land they have purchased 
from Linden cannot be taken from them without just 
compensation. 
Finally, Linden’s representations concerning its grant of 
intellectual property (“IP”) rights to its users are misleading 
because the representations can cause the users to conflate IP rights 
 
 231 Ondrejka, supra note 36, at 100. 
 232 Perhaps realizing the potential liability that such statements may bring, Linden has 
eschewed making them. For example, in response to a question about whether running 
Second Life is like running an independent country, Rosedale dodged, stating,  
We have learned a lot about monetary policy!  I love it.  We 
recognize that the GDP in SL is growing at a rate that is staggeringly 
fast, relative to real world economies.  I call it light central bank 
functions.  We would love to find a great economist to come and join 
us!  
Bulkley, supra note 228, at 5. 
 233 See Second Life—Currency Exchange, supra note 27. 
 234 See Ferret, supra note 24 (describing Linden’s decision to shut down casinos in 
Second Life in response to an FBI probe). 
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with rights to their virtual property.  For example, Linden founder 
and then-CEO Philip Rosedale stated in Linden’s press release 
regarding IP rights: 
We believe our new policy recognizes the fact that 
persistent world users are making significant 
contributions to building these worlds and should be 
able to both own the content they create and share 
in the value that is created.  The preservation of 
users’ property rights is a necessary step toward the 
emergence of genuinely real online worlds.235 
Notably, the phrase “property rights” in the last sentence of the 
quoted passage is not qualified by the term “intellectual.”  Thus, a 
land purchaser seeing such a statement may believe that she has 
property rights not simply to the objects she creates, but also to the 
land that she purchased from Linden. 
Although Linden has taken steps to strip a majority of the 
“ownership” language from its website236 and altered its ToS to 
make the distinction between IP and virtual property clearer,237 
these actions, particularly because they have been conducted 
relatively sub rosa, will not aid Linden in actions brought by 
 
 235 Press Release, Linden Lab, Second Life Residents to Own Digital Creations (Nov. 
14, 2003), available at http://lindenlab.com/pressroom/releases/03_11_14. 
 236 For example, the homepage of Second Life used to say, “Second Life is a 3D online 
digital world imagined, created and owned by its residents”; however, now it simply says, 
“Second Life is a 3D online digital world imagined and created by its residents.” See 
Second Life—What Is Second Life?, http://secondlife.com/whatis (last visited Feb. 28, 
2009); Posting of Ren Reynolds to Terra Nova Blog, Residents No Longer Own Second 
Life?, http://terranova.blogs.com/terra_nova/2007/10/residents-no-lo.html#more (Oct. 27, 
2007, 06:56).  Similarly, the “IP Rights” page on Second Life’s site used to say “You 
create it, you own it—and it’s yours to do with as you please.” See Posting of Steve 
O’Hear to ZDnet’s The Social Web, Second Life IP Rights; Here Today, Gone 
Tomorrow, http://blogs.zdnet.com/social/?p=83 (Feb. 3, 2007, 7:38 A.M.).  In February 
2008, however, it only said, “If you create it, you can sell it, trade it, and even give it 
away for free, subject of course to our Terms of Service.” Second Life—IP Rights, supra 
note 54.  Now, the Second Life Terms of Service reads “[Y]ou will retain any and all 
applicable copyright and other intellectual property rights with respect to any Content 
you create using the Service, to the extent you have such rights under applicable law.” 
Second Life—Terms of Service, supra note 15, § 3.1. 
 237 See Second Life—Terms of Service, supra note 15, § 3.3 (“Linden Lab retains 
ownership of the account and related data, regardless of intellectual property rights you 
may have in content you create or otherwise own.”). 
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Second Life landowners who have already relied upon Linden’s 
past representations. 
In response to a complaint, Linden would undoubtedly argue 
that the ToS clarify that all users only retain ownership of their IP 
rights and not Linden’s server space where the users’ land resides.  
Moreover, the low price of the land compared to real property, 
Linden would argue, should be a sign to Second Life users that 
when they bought land from Linden, they were not getting all of 
the sticks in the property rights bundle.  Consequently, as Linden 
would conclude, it is not reasonable for Second Life users to be 
confused about the extent of their ownership. 
Linden’s arguments are unavailing.  First, as stated above, the 
ToS never explicitly mention the word “land” or makes the point 
that the land language Linden uses is simply an analogy.  If Linden 
is going to rely on its ToS, which in any event most users likely do 
not read, it should at least make the terms as clear and as explicit 
as possible.  Of course, Linden has an incentive to keep the ToS 
unclear because as long as users continue buying land and continue 
believing they own it, Linden’s revenue will increase.  Second, the 
price of the land should not necessarily serve a cautionary function 
to Second Life users.  To be sure, it would be absurd in the real 
world for one to think that she could acquire title to sixteen acres 
of real property for a couple thousand dollars.  It would not be so 
absurd in Second Life, however, because its market for land is 
entirely new.  Second Life users have no way of knowing what 
land price seems commensurate with the rights they think they are 
getting when they buy land. 
The two potential pitfalls to litigants under the UCL, standing 
and damages, also do not appear to pose significant threats to 
potential aggrieved Second Life users.  A Second Life user who 
had her land stripped away by Linden would suffer the requisite 
injury-in-fact because she has been directly and personally affected 
by Linden’s actions.  Additionally, the termination of her account 
would amount to the satisfaction of the other requisite for 
standing—lost money or property as a result of the allegedly unfair 
business practice—because even if a court does not see the land as 
property, there is clearly a strong market in real-world currency for 
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land in Second Life.  Thus, the seizure of the land would in fact 
amount to lost money. 
Additionally, although damages are not available to any litigant 
under the UCL, an aggrieved Second Life user seems to be a likely 
candidate to recover via restitution.  A court, using its equitable 
powers, would likely find that the Second Life user had a vested 
property right to or ownership interest in her land and that 
restitution of the value of the land to the user would return her to 
status quo ante before she was misled about the nature of her land 
purchase.  Moreover, even though Linden has taken some steps to 
change the nature of its misrepresentations and, arguably, has 
stopped engaging in its unlawful conduct, a court could still order 
restitution even when injunctive relief may no longer be 
appropriate. 
CONCLUSION 
In their seminal article published more than ten years ago, 
David Post and David Johnson argued that cyberspace should be 
governed by its own set of rules apart from the real world.238  More 
recently, Post and Johnson applied their argument to virtual 
worlds, predicting that “territorially-based law will not play a 
significant role in resolving [virtual-world] disputes; it will prove 
too complex . . . and too expensive . . . .”239  Post and Johnson may 
prove to be right in the long term, and their argument may be 
particularly applicable to user-versus-user conflicts in virtual 
worlds; however, it does not seem particularly correct regarding 
user-versus-operator conflicts, particularly virtual-world operators 
like Second Life.  Linden has actively commodified its world and 
made misleading representations regarding land ownership in 
 
 238 See David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders—The Rise of Law and 
Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367, 1375 (1996) (“If the sysops and users who 
collectively inhabit and control a particular area of the Net want to establish special rules 
to govern conduct there, and if that rule does not fundamentally impinge upon the vital 
interests of others who never visit this new space, then the law of sovereigns in the 
physical world should defer to this new form of self-government.”). 
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Second Life because it has been in its business interest to do so.  It 
is inevitable that Second Life users will in the near future call upon 
real-world law, and particularly consumer protection law, to 
resolve disputes between themselves and Linden.  The California 
consumer protection regime discussed in this Note, unlike the 
current contract- and property-based regimes, provides a body of 
law readily applicable to hold Linden accountable for its 
misrepresentations.  This Note’s discussion hopefully will provide 
those who have sustained a loss of assets with a possible approach 
to litigation against Linden, as well as prompt further change in 
Linden’s behavior and its representations to its most loyal users.  
Users who buy land in Second Life have an interest in seeing 
Second Life continue to thrive.  Linden should recognize this and, 
most of all, make sure that it no longer alienates or misleads those 
who have come to love their alternate reality, the second life with 
which Linden has helped provide them. 
 
